I discussed in Chapter 1 how standard economic theory sets out to demonstrate how markets can work. The basic thrust of the argument is that unfettered self-seeking competitive behaviour coordinates an economy and achieves optimal wealth creation and welfare. Markets are self-equilibrating so that inhibiting the behaviour of those in them or interfering with them in any other way than to encourage competition can only produce suboptimal outcomes.
three centuries earlier its ideological manifestation had legitimated an end to royal monopolies and barriers to free trade.
A central question that might be used to judge any theory is to ask what it is for. Theories designed to show how markets produce an efficient equilibrium must struggle when asked why they sometimes do not. The only answer available from within the paradigm is that governments and institutions have interfered -markets aren't being allowed to work as they could. Although different at first sight, both information economics and behavioural economics can be kept within the same paradigm. In essence what they both do is show up potential interferences that need attention if things are to work -they can then be used to support measures such as transparent contracting to resolve agency issues, derivative or virtual market creation to complete markets, or behavioural finance investment strategies to 'clean up' the anomalies caused by investor biases. The last proposal is particularly popular among some finance professionals because it gives them a role, which efficient market theories do not. In any case none of these theories from within the central paradigm really has any rigorous explanation for financial instability.
This chapter aims to set out a framework to understand the minimum requirements for a new economic theory of financial markets directly aimed at understanding their empirical reality and how it can lead to persistent instability -as is now much more widely accepted to be a risk than it was five years ago. As I showed in Chapter 1 severe bouts of instability are nearly always associated with the arrival of new, exciting products and then subsequent dislocations in risk-reward relationships.
My ideas about phantastic objects, narratives, and states of mind were built up as I struggled to understand empirical reality while in a to-and-fro process of collecting data and thinking about it. They emerged as I did the interviews and thought about them as what sociologists call 'grounded theory' (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Brown 1973) . I have mentioned, for example, how in my very first pilot interview it became evident that the simplified model of rational decision-making used in standard theory just didn't seem to apply to what my respondent was trying to do. He could calculate as much as he liked but he was still left with uncertainty and several equally attractive alternatives from which he selected by touch and feel. The world of the four asset managers described in Chapter 2 elaborated this first impression about uncertainty and revealed three further emerging themes. My respondents seemed to be talking about making and breaking emotional attachments to stock. They seemed to be strongly influenced by, and oriented towards, their feelings within a social and institutional context. And they dealt with all this by telling stories. These first four interviews had made clear the decision context (what Talcott Parsons (1937) called the conditions for social action) and in doing so demonstrated the very limited utility of economic rationality as a significant guide to behaviour.
